Why Has the NFL’s Explosive Passing Game Disappeared?

I envy the NFL fans who consume the majority of their football via the NFL RedZone channel this season. Scott Hanson spoon-feeds the best of the league’s play-by-play action to fans this way, all while projecting one of my favorite misconceptions about football: Because any play has an opportunity to dramatically shift the course of the game, especially those inside the 20, every play carries similar importance.

As nice as it may be to believe, that’s simply not the case, and watching games through RedZone belies the reality of any given NFL Sunday. Last week, for every RedZone-worthy play in your average matchup—we’ll pick the Broncos and Bucs—there were dozens of snaps you didn’t see: plays in which quarterbacks Bo Nix and Baker Mayfield coughed, sputtered, and generally made a mess of themselves in the pocket.

If you only read the box score, you’d see the pair of passers combined for 69 passing attempts, 379 passing yards, a touchdown, an interception, and seven sacks in the Broncos’ 26-7 win. I turned the game off thinking that the days of inflated passing production may actually be over.

The league’s passing data through three weeks is indeed jarring—and not in a good way. This is the first time since 2008 that there have been fewer than 20,000 passing yards across the league through the first three weeks. Air yards per attempt are the lowest they’ve been since tracking began in 2006, sack rates are the highest we’ve seen this millennium, and the rate of completions over 20 yards hasn’t been this low since 2003. Only two quarterbacks are averaging at least 275 passing yards a game in the first three games (Brock Purdy and Dak Prescott), and there are only eight quarterbacks with five or more passing touchdowns.

Teams scored a total of just 215 touchdowns in the first three weeks—you’d have to go back to 2006 to find lower-scoring production through that point in the season.

Football fans and NFL media alike grew a bit too accustomed to gaudy numbers and high-scoring games during the big boom of passing offense over the last decade. All but two of the NFL’s 15 5,000-yard passing seasons (and 61 of the 80 4,500-yard seasons in league history) have come since 2010. It was an unquestionably fun time, and I don’t blame anyone for feeling nostalgic about the good old days of the 2010s after a dull start to this season.

However, it feels clear to me that some poor assumptions were made, and worse conclusions were drawn, about the long-term future of the sport, particularly about defense—and that’s why we’ve seen such panicked discourse recently over the downward trend in the rate of explosive pass plays.

That narrative reached a fever pitch last Thursday, when ESPN draft analyst Mel Kiper Jr., in an epically unhinged rant, called for the NFL to outlaw the Cover 2 defense in hopes of saving offense. But trying to identify—let alone extricate—any one factor, especially a single coverage scheme, as the cause for the dip in passing production and scoring is a good way to run around in circles, chasing results over process. On the other hand, simply acknowledging that what we see between the lines is a combination of several things is, well, boring.

What I’ll do instead is attempt to properly weigh and analyze which factors have had the greatest effect on passing depression through three weeks.

I’ve created a dataset to home in on what we’re seeing from the passing game on a down-to-down basis beyond what you’ll see in a box score or on RedZone. To do so, I’ve removed passes from inside the “scoring zone,” as I’d call it (inside the opponent’s 30-yard line), or when the offense is backed up (inside its own 10), because play-calling is often impacted in ways you wouldn’t see in the open field. Play-action passes are also removed because run-pass options and bootlegs are difficult to extricate—and there’s a big difference between throwing quickly into the flat and trying to throw a post route.

We’re comparing data over the past six seasons, from 2019 through the first three weeks of 2024, because during that span, there’s more robust tracking data available through Next Gen Stats, as well as coverage identification and advanced analytics to pull from. Applying these guardrails gives us a chance to compare apples to apples in the modern passing game.

So what’s going on? Let’s start with Kiper’s nightmare, split safety shells.

Cover 2 Is Confounding Even the Experienced Quarterbacks

There’s been an influx of young quarterbacks at the helm across the league (and we’ll spend some time on how they’ve influenced the passing dip a little later), but the depressed passing data is notable because of how it’s impacting many of the best quarterbacks of this generation. Passers like Patrick Mahomes, Josh Allen, Lamar Jackson, Joe Burrow, and Justin Herbert are entering their physical and mental primes—and we’re still seeing scoring and explosive offensive production stall out.

By using the dataset we’ve created to even the passing playing field, we’ve charted 28 veteran quarterbacks—those in at least their fifth season in the NFL—who have taken at least one dropback. That group has posted the second-lowest success rate and lowest explosive pass rate since 2019.

In recent seasons, instead of bringing heavy pressure, defenses are increasingly going the opposite way and playing much more split safety defense—zone coverages with two deep safeties, like quarters and Cover 2. Teams have played Cover 3 at less than a 40 percent rate on non-blitzing reps every season since 2020. This means we’re seeing fewer teams crowding the box to stop the run and more defensive schemes geared to take away intermediate and deep passes, giving corners and linebackers help over the top.

When defenses have played split safety zone shells (Cover 2, Cover 4, and even Cover 6 schemes), offenses have largely stopped trying to push the ball downfield. Quarterbacks are averaging just 6.7 air yards per attempt against these coverage shells, so ESPN’s Mina Kimes wasn’t lying when she recently called this year’s passers “checkdown artists.”

It’s not always the wrong move to dump the ball off and live to fight another down, especially when we’re seeing an average of 5.1 yards after the catch on completions against two-deep zones this season. Using checkdowns and underneath passes against defenses committed to playing with depth is essentially an extension of the running game and often the best way to attack this style of defense.

Some of the experienced quarterbacks in the league have found a successful formula to attack split safeties. Joe Burrow, for example, has faced defenses that take every measure to keep the ball in front of them so they don’t get burned by Ja’Marr Chase, and he has responded by getting the ball out quickly and letting his receivers work in space. His average time to throw of 2.21 seconds against two-deep zone shells is the quickest in his career and fourth fastest among the 28 experienced quarterbacks in our sample. And even with this emphasis on the quick game, he’s still 11th in air yards per attempt (5.3) this season. Lamar Jackson, meanwhile, has gone a different route, scrambling at the second-highest rate (11.5 percent) and holding the ball for 2.76 seconds on average (which ranks eighth) while pushing the ball farther downfield than Burrow (6.1 air yards per attempt). Josh Allen, with an average time to throw of 2.94 seconds, is holding the ball even longer than all but one other starting QB this season but has yet to scramble against two-deep zones this season. It’s in his football DNA to throw deep, and he’s the only quarterback averaging more than 10 air yards against two-deep zones this year. Burrow, Jackson, and Allen each rank in the top five in success rate, and each does it in a different way.

Now, if everyone could play like Allen, Jackson, or Burrow and do it every single week, we wouldn’t even be having this conversation. Take Jared Goff as an example. He has as much experience under center as any other high-profile starter, yet he still ranks last in expected points added per dropback and 15th in success rate against two-deep zones, and he doesn’t have a single completion of more than 20 yards against those coverage shells this year. There’s been a clear attempt from opposing defenses to put a shell on Ben Johnson’s offense, and, as a result, Goff isn’t working with the same rhythm we saw from him last year—and his lack of mobility hamstrings his options to create plays in other ways.

In the clip below, Goff is presented with a simulated pressure from Tampa Bay in Week 2, where a linebacker rushes and a defensive end replaces him in coverage. The Bucs are playing Cover 6—playing Cover 4 on one side of the field and Cover 2 on the other—in the back end of the defense. Goff properly identifies the coverage, but by the time his receiver on a deep in-breaking route gets into an open window, Goff has already started his checkdown throw.

This is an example of the discomfort quarterbacks face when there’s a hint of uncertainty about what defenders are doing in the intermediate area of the field, and there’s an understandable impulse to play it safe as a result. When defenses are wholly committed to taking away explosive offense, quarterbacks with limited arm talent and mobility are most likely to struggle or play conservatively. To me, the downward trend of big passing plays is less a signal of poor offensive execution and more a natural response from quarterbacks and play callers alike. The cliché that an offense is simply “taking what the defense gives us” wasn’t an issue when quarterbacks were more likely to play one-on-one downfield, and right now, those matchups are coming up more often underneath. Because of that, we’re seeing more yards after the catch but less explosive downfield passing, and that may not change much over the course of the year, because defenses aren’t likely to abandon a play style that’s netted good outcomes—no matter what Kiper is calling for on television.

Young, Inexperienced Quarterbacks Are Dragging the Data Down

One of the old adages of quarterback development is that it takes at least two seasons before a quarterback actually knows what they’re looking at, and if you watched HBO’s Hard Knocks with the Chicago Bears this summer, head coach Matt Eberflus echoed this sentiment in a conversation with retired Alabama coach Nick Saban. Conversations around patient development have been especially relevant this season. There are currently three rookies starting for their teams (Caleb Williams in Chicago, Jayden Daniels in Washington, and Bo Nix in Denver), while two more first-rounders (Drake Maye and Michael Penix Jr.) are serving as backups. The other first-rounder, J.J. McCarthy, is injured and out for the year.

If we look leaguewide, 75 percent of the starters this season are under 30 years old. It’s clear we’re firmly in a new generation of passers.

Young guys normally take their lumps, though, and that’s been borne out by the data in this exercise. The 10 starting quarterbacks this season with less than five years of NFL experience (the sample grows to 16 when we include backups who have taken at least one dropback) have the lowest success rate—by a sizable margin among a sample of young quarterbacks over the past six years.

Young quarterbacks have to earn the respect of NFL defenses from the pocket, and while defenses aren’t blitzing at a higher rate this year than in recent seasons, plenty of those blitzes are causing problems for inexperienced passers. If you watched the Texans’ nonstop pass-rushing display against Williams and the Bears in Week 2, that’s not a surprise. But even San Francisco’s Purdy, who now has plenty of experience as a starter, struggled against the Vikings’ blitzes in Week 2. In the clip below, Minnesota takes advantage of San Francisco’s relatively simple pass protection plan, and because Purdy fails to identify potentially unblockable rushers, he never feels where the blitz is coming from or knows where to go with the ball.

Handling the blitz has been the difference between rookies Caleb Williams and Jayden Daniels, who’ve been blitzed 24 and 21 times in our sample, respectively. Daniels has been better than Williams at protecting the ball (zero interceptions), and even though he took five sacks in a Week 2 game against the Giants, negative plays haven’t cost his team wins yet. Williams has been a mess in comparison and is taking a sack on 16.7 percent of his dropbacks when blitzed—that ranks 26th among all QBs. We can debate the differences in their respective offenses and the quality of their opponents to this point, but the fact of the matter is that among young quarterbacks, only Will Levis and Bryce Young have been worse than Williams against pressure—and one of them just got benched.

Defenses are sacking these inexperienced quarterbacks—those with less than five years’ experience—at an inflated rate of 9.4 percent this season: much higher than the 7.6 percent average over the past six years. Young’s stint as the Panthers’ starter failed for several reasons, but he’s ultimately the poster child for the ways poor pocket management can derail a quarterback’s career. In our dataset, Young had a career minus-.613 EPA per dropback when pressured and a 9.6 percent sack rate—take those weaknesses in tandem, and you’ve got an unplayable quarterback.

Young passers are struggling while working against some basic defensive looks from their opponents, and it’s hampered both offensive explosiveness and efficiency. While split safety defense is on the rise, Cover 3 is still the lead coverage call in the NFL. And these young passers with less than five years of experience are getting their butts kicked against simple defense, posting a 34.8 percent success rate and a minus-.243 EPA per dropback against Cover 3—both the worst in the six-year sample.

In the clip below from Week 2, Bo Nix is getting a simple coverage picture from Pittsburgh: a defense that plays Cover 3 at the second-highest rate in the NFL. The passing concept calls for the quarterback to look backside against a single-high safety alignment and find a receiver on a deep crossing route, assuming the isolated receiver and running back are covered. Nix’s hesitation to take the chance downfield wastes an opportunity in which he had a clean pocket, and he’s forced to take a checkdown while falling away from an emerging pass rusher.

The only point we’re seeing young quarterbacks thrive is when they’re attacking man coverages behind a base pass rush: a style of defense teams just aren’t playing that much anymore. This is the only time in the six-year sample, dating back to 2019, that defenses have collectively played fewer than 100 snaps of base defense, but quarterbacks are successful against it—with a positive EPA per dropback of .363—which tells me these quarterbacks are encouraged to push the ball downfield when they see clear one-on-one chances. This season’s 12.8 air yards per attempt on dropback passes against base man coverages are the highest in our six-year sample.

Just take Justin Fields, whose young career finally seems like it’s taking off in Pittsburgh, as an example. On this third-and-long, the way the Chargers play Cover 1 behind a four-man rush is just asking to give up an easy completion and giving space for yards after the catch, and tight end Pat Freiermuth wins on an option route. Easy yards for Fields.

Those kinds of option routes are a feature in several offenses, notably those designed by Kyle Shanahan in San Francisco, Sean McVay for the Rams, Joe Brady in Buffalo, and Ben Johnson in Detroit, and they give quarterbacks easy outlets against man coverage. Because quarterbacks are better equipped to identify man coverage and are playing in schemes designed to isolate receivers, we’re seeing fewer passers forced to take low-percentage chances outside the numbers.

Eventually, the young quarterbacks will have enough reps against a host of defensive coverages and have an improved sense of where to go with the ball against zone vs. man schemes. Their process will speed up, and they’ll be able to move through their progressions more quickly if the first read isn’t open. Right now, though, the young group of passers is dragging down the 2024 passing data.

Now that we’ve been through the root of the passing problem, we must ask: Is it fixable? And if so, what will it take?

I say yes—if NFL quarterbacks and their play callers have the courage.

No More Cowardly Quarterbacking

There are still some analysts—including me—who want to see play callers and quarterbacks reject the notion that offenses simply can’t push the ball downfield against two-deep zones. Acknowledging that the degree of difficulty on these deep throws is higher, the best way to keep defenses from dictating the terms may be to answer with aggression, and that applies regardless of experience level.

The return on investment is often worth the risk. Using our dataset, on throws of 15 or more air yards against split safety defenses, NFL offenses this season have a 50 percent success rate and are averaging .728 EPA per dropback, second and third in our six-year sample, respectively. Seahawks quarterback Geno Smith, who’s quietly put together an excellent start to the 2024 season, gives us a good example of how to do this below. On this play from Week 3, Miami is playing Cover 6, and Seattle offensive coordinator Ryan Grubb has drawn up a play concept that’s specifically for attacking a two-high defense: a deep in-breaking route that converts into a double move if the safety is playing too low. Seattle receiver DK Metcalf reads the coverage properly, and the second he breaks upfield, there’s nothing keeping him out of the end zone.

There’s a trade-off for this kind of aggression, and it’s asking your quarterback to hang in the pocket longer than most coaches are comfortable with. Quarterbacks are taking an average of 4.09 seconds to throw the passes that travel 15 or more yards downfield against two-deep zones this season. That’s a long time, and it opens quarterbacks up to a lot of risk on low-percentage throws. It’s generally thought that holding the ball and throwing it late is a risky way for quarterbacks to live, and that opens the door for negative plays, like sacks and interceptions. But at some point, courageous quarterbacks and play callers must take the shots needed to uncap these deep defensive coverage schemes.

I’m not necessarily pining for football to go to the “home run, walk, or strikeout” method of professional baseball because I don’t love the viewing experience when the strategy is all or nothing. That said, football is a game won along the margins, and conceding high-variance outcomes to defense seems certain to keep production down. I’ll be skipping RedZone and intently watching down to down to see which teams and quarterbacks break us out of the passing gridlock.