Russia’s nuclear doctrine lowering the threshold for using the world’s largest atomic weapons arsenal was announced in September, but the decree formalizing the changes was pointed in its timing.
President Vladimir Putin’s approval of the document seen on Tuesday was inked 1,000 days from the start of his full-scale invasion of Ukraine and followed President Joe Biden administration reportedly dropping restrictions on Kyiv using ATACMS (Army Tactical Missile System) to strike inside Russian territory.
“I’m somewhat astounded about the details and very broad scenarios described in the document,” said Hans Kristensen, director of the nuclear information project at the Federation of American Scientists (FAS). “It goes far beyond what we have seen in documents from other nuclear-armed states,” he told Newsweek.
Ukraine had long been calling for the restrictions on ATACMS to be dropped, while the Kremlin had been warning any such move would be deemed as direct NATO involvement in the war, having already repeatedly called the conflict a proxy war with the alliance.
The document codifying Putin’s latest saber-rattling move to dissuade Kyiv’s backers from providing military support comes as Donald Trump reenters the White House having criticized U.S. aid and insisted he can end the war.
“This is clearly a Russian tit for tat. At this stage, it is purely symbolic, but that doesn’t mean that the Russians aren’t contemplating more concrete forms of retaliation,” Mark Episkopos, a research fellow in the Quincy Institute’s Eurasia Program told Newsweek.
Among the 26 paragraphs of the update are four key changes from its previous version of June 2020:
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It Includes Belarus
Aggression against the other member of the Union State has been added to the updated doctrine, where previously, only aggression against Russia was mentioned.
The leader of Belarus, Alexander Lukashenko, is Putin’s closest ally in Europe and has allowed his country to host Russian nuclear warheads which are still controlled by Moscow and whose location close to Ukraine has sparked alarm.
Lukashenko referenced the broadening of Russia’s nuclear doctrine in September, saying that “an attack on Belarus will trigger a Third World War.”
Lower Threshold
Russia had previously warned of a nuclear response if “the very existence of the state is threatened” although many have argued over what this meant.
The revised guidelines now refer to “a critical threat” to “sovereignty” as well as the “territorial integrity” of Russia and Belarus.
Paragraph 10 says that Russia will perceive the aggression of any state from a bloc or alliance as an aggression of this coalition “as a whole.” The 11th paragraph says aggression against Russia “and/or its allies by any non-nuclear state with the participation or support of a nuclear state shall be considered as a joint attack.”
When Putin outlined the changes in September, he did not mention any country by name, but the context was clear—given that Ukraine is a non-nuclear state that gets military support from the U.S. and other nuclear-armed countries.
“The problem for the Kremlin, of course, is whether the threat of nuclear retaliation to Ukraine striking targets inside Russia with Western conventional weapons is a credible threat,” said Kristensen.
“The West would have to believe that Putin would actually order the use of nuclear weapons in retaliation for a very limited conventional attack that does not in any way threaten Russia’s survival or its ability to operate its nuclear forces,” he said.
“Putin would have to be willing to risk potential consequences to Russia that far exceed any damage a Ukrainian conventional attack could cause.”
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Expanded List of Military Dangers
The new doctrine has increased the list of what Russia considers military dangers that might necessitate a nuclear response.
This includes the possession of any type of weapon of mass destruction which can be used against Russia, military exercises near Russia’s borders, as well as attempts to hit environmentally hazardous facilities or isolate part of the territory of Russia.
“Russia’s willingness to climb the nuclear ladder to a great extent comes down to the thinking and the predilections of one man, Vladimir Putin,” said Episkopos. “There’s of course a lot we don’t know about how Vladimir Putin sees the course of this war and his own personal red lines.”
Not Just Deterrence
The updated doctrine no longer says that Russia regards nuclear weapons “solely” as a means of deterrence, and adds that Moscow can use the threat of nuclear weapons against “potential” enemies.
It also says that nuclear deterrence would be in response to states that provide the territory, airspace, sea space and resources under their control “to prepare and implement aggression against the Russian Federation.”
Even though the nuclear doctrine’s rubber-stamping coincided with the Biden administration green-lighting ATACMS use in Russia, the U.S. National Security Council said it had not seen any reason to adjust its nuclear posture.
“The Russian perception that this is a step by the Biden administration to tie Trump’s hands when he gets into office,” said Episkopos from the Quincy Institute. “So the Russians have every incentive not to forcefully respond to this ATACMS decision.”
Meanwhile, Kristensen said that the decree the document was “for public consumption and propaganda that doesn’t necessarily tell us very much about how or to what extent Russian nuclear planning would actually change as a result.”
