Russian President Vladimir Putin’s unveiling of his new intermediate-range hypersonic ballistic missile and statements about its strength have left questions about how the weapon will change the landscape of nuclear warfare.
The Kremlin fired the experimental “Oreshnik,” or “hazel tree,” for the first time in an attack on a defense factory in the central Ukrainian city of Dnipro in late November. Ukraine’s military intelligence agency said the missile carried six warheads, and each deployed six sub-munitions.
Intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles with a range above 500 kilometers and below 5,500 kilometers are banned under a Soviet-era treaty between Washington and Moscow, although the U.S. pulled out of it in 2019 after accusing Russia of violating the agreement.
Putin said on Tuesday that Russia did not need to “improve the nuclear doctrine” but would instead focus on improving the Oreshnik. Russia updated its nuclear doctrine last month to justify a nuclear strike in response to an attack on Russia by a non-nuclear country, if they are backed by a nuclear-armed nation.
Uncredited, Russian Defense Ministry Press Service/Associated Press
“If we take a closer look, a sufficient amount of these cutting-edge weapon systems will actually eliminate the need for the use of nuclear weapons,” Putin said in remarks reported by Russian state news agency Tass.
Some experts wonder if efforts to develop additional weapons like the Oreshnik will transform the rules of nuclear warfare after nearly three years of what NATO has denounced as nuclear saber-rattling from Moscow.
Newsweek reached out to the Russian Ministry of Defense for comment via email.
Photo Illustration by Newsweek/Getty Images
What is the Oreshnik Missile?
The weapon is believed to be a modified version of Russia’s RS-26 “Rubezh” intermediate-range ballistic missile, with one component part of a Bulava missile, which was developed in Moscow in the 1990s.
In addition to boasting about the Oreshnik’s power and suggesting the irrelevance of nuclear weapons now that it has been deployed, Putin also highlighted that it travels at 10 times the speed of sound, or Mach 10.
Ukrainian officials said that it was the first known combat use of an intercontinental ballistic missile and reached Mach 11.
The medium-range ballistic missile’s ability to maneuver mid-flight at high speeds is what earned it the label “hypersonic.” Hypersonic missiles are not only known for their speed but also their ability to carry out precision strikes and deliver warheads to a large amount of territory.
The Oreshnik functions as a Cold War-era multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV), meaning it can carry a series of warheads aimed at numerous specific locations.
As the weapon is an intermediate-range missile rather than a long-range missile, Russia is not restricted in its use by the New START Treaty, which places limits on Russian deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles.
Russia’s Updated Nuclear Doctrine
Putin signed an updated Russian nuclear doctrine into law in November, as Ukraine marked 1,000 days of war with its neighbor.
In the updated doctrine, Putin established that Russian deterrence will be carried out “against a potential enemy” and that this should ensure “an understanding by a potential adversary of the inevitability of retaliation in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation and [or] its allies.”
The update came after U.S. President Joe Biden authorized Ukraine to utilize long-range Western weapons when conducting deep strikes into Russian territory.
Following Russia’s attack on Dnipro using the Oreshnik, the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry estimated that Russia could produce 25 Oreshniks per month, amounting to 300 missiles per year, according to Military Watch Magazine. However, Andrii Kovalenko, the chief of Ukraine’s Center for Countering Disinformation, dismissed the estimate in a post on Telegram.
“The media outlet through which this disinformation is spread in the English-speaking world is a kind of gasket for legitimizing information favorable to Russia and further spreading it,” he wrote.
While he noted that Russia’s production of high-tech missiles has slowed significantly because of sanctions, Kovalenko added: “However, the production of more technologically advanced missiles, such as the Kinzhal, is limited to a few. And the Oreshnik is an even more technologically advanced cycle, so the information about the stamping of this intercontinental ballistic missile is a deliberate fake. The purpose of the fake is to spread fear in Western societies.”
Putin also reportedly noted that several strikes conducted with these types of missiles could be comparable in terms of destructive power to nuclear weapons, according to the Russian outlet The Insider.
Could be an Intimidation Tactic
Newsweek spoke to John Erath, senior policy director for the Center for Arms Control and Proliferation, about whether Russia’s use of the Oreshnik could change the rules of nuclear warfare.
“Not at all,” he said. “They already have the capability to deliver nuclear weapons wherever they want. This particular missile is nuclear capable, so you can put a nuclear weapon on it. So, if it’s launched toward Western Europe, it is explicitly a nuclear threat. Because you don’t know what the warhead is until the thing lands and explodes.”
He regarded Putin’s signing of an updated nuclear doctrine similarly and described it as an “intimidation tactic.”
“The way that they updated the nuclear doctrine that was not too significant,” Erath said. “It was updated to be a little bit more threatening, but the spirit of the thing is very much the same. Again, we look at it in terms of the overall Russian strategy of persuading countries supporting Ukraine that it’s going to cost them more in every sense to continue to support Ukraine than it would to make a quick peace and get out.”
In a commentary for the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), senior research fellow Sidharth Kaushal and director of military sciences Matthew Savill wrote about their thoughts regarding Russia’s use of the Oreshnik, and its ramifications on the landscape of nuclear warfare.
“For Russia, massed drone attacks and a mixture of ballistic and cruise missile strikes provide the most tactically useful riposte or form of pressure, especially heading into the winter,” they wrote. “The use of Oreshnik is therefore unlikely to significantly alter calculations on how best to launch or deter long-range strikes by either side.
“This exacerbates the deterrence dilemma for Russia in the more significant area, which is broader strategic stability. On the one hand, critical red lines have not been crossed by either side: NATO forces have not directly deployed into Ukraine to fight Russian forces, and Russia has not launched a conventional military attack on NATO countries. And at least some norms have been kept in place, with the Russian pre-launch notification being given to the U.S.”
